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Lower ranking officials will not be able to claim immunity before the STL.
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“rationae matariae”) immunity protections. State officials are either afforded
functional immunity protections or personal immunity protections, or both, depending
on the rank of their position and if they are current or formal officials.
3. Diplomatic immunity claims can be determined by analogy to high-ranking state
official claims.
4. The current general rule for high-ranking state official immunities is one of
affording restrictive immunity. State Official Immunity Protections are not absolute;
immunities can be contested through three exceptions.
5. Evaluating the Courts characteristics of the STL including, title and description,
location, judicial composition, procedure and funding reveal that it is a
characteristically international hybrid tribunal.
6. The Treaty for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was ratified by both
Lebanon and Syria, and is evidence of waiver of immunities by the Syrian
government. However, Syria will still be afforded the opportunity to try its officials in
its own domestic courts and is unlikely to give the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
precedence
7. The volatile history between the Syria and Lebanon makes it doubtful that Syria
will explicitly waive immunities for its high ranking state officials.
8. Two additional exceptions to immunity protections apply to former high-ranking
state officials, these exceptions include removal for immunity for 1) acts completed
prior to or after the individual was in office and 2) acts complete outside of the
“official capacity” of the officials position. Former Syrian officials will not receive
immunity protections for the terrorist bombing.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Scope

This memorandum evaluates the possible types of immunity claims an accused state
official may have before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Additionally, the
memorandum will address the consequences of each immunity protection if these claims are
upheld.* Possible claims will be analyzed for all lower ranking state officials and categorically
for former and current higher ranking state officials. Additionally, the exceptions that invalidate
immunity claims will be evaluated including: being tried by an international tribunal, wavier by a
nation through a treaty, and waiver by nations through other implicit or explicit means. In
addition to immunity claims from the accused, the STL may face claims from witnesses who are
state officials. This aspect is outside of the scope of this memorandum and will be addressed in
later work. This memorandum will conduct its legal analysis by focusing primarily on the
approaches of previous ad hoc and hybrid tribunals including: 1) the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2) the Special Court for Sierra Leon (SCSL), 3) the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the 4) Extraordinary Chambers in the

“Would an accused or a witness who is a state official be able to claim immunity from
before the STL? If so, what type of immunity and what would the consequences of such
a successful claim be?” This memorandum topic has been scaled down to only address
state official immunity claims for content and time purposes. The issue of immunity for
witnesses who are state officials will be addressed in the spring semester of 2010 in a
separate student memorandum.
*
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Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), as these tribunals best reflect the traits of the STL.1 In addition,
legal precedent from the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), and a selection of domestic case law will be provided for further comparison and analogy.
B.

Summary of conclusions
1.

Lower Ranking officials will not be able to claim immunity before the STL.
State Official immunities are reserved for high ranking state officials including;

including; Diplomats, Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers of Foreign
Affairs. Low ranking state officials that do not function in a similar capacity to these
positions in their jobs will not be provided immunity protections for the Hariri
assassination, and the STL will have the same jurisdiction over these individuals as they
would over non-government citizens.
2. There are two categories of immunity protections afforded to state officials;
1) personal (“ratione personae”) immunity protections and 2) functional
immunities ( “rationae matariae”) immunity protections. State officials are either
afforded functional immunity protections or personal immunity protections, or
both, depending on the rank of their position and if they are current or formal
officials.
Personal immunities provide a complete bar from criminal prosecution in foreign
jurisdiction for high-ranking state officials over any act they execute, both within and
outside of their official duties. In general, functional immunities are provided to all
ranking state officials for acts carried out as part of their official duties for their state.

1

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 35–38 (April, 10 2008). [reproduced in accompanying
notebook III at tab 54].
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The immunities for their official acts exist both while they are in office and after they
leave office.
3. Diplomatic immunity claims can be determined by analogy to high-ranking
state official claims.
Analysis for diplomatic immunity claims is approached in the same manner as
current high-ranking state officials immunities, and diplomats are subject to the same
exceptions the same immunity protections. However, the protections given to diplomats
for their private acts (personal immunity protections) are limited to the receiving states.
The current general rule for high-ranking state official immunities is one of affording
restrictive immunity. State Official Immunity Protections are not absolute; immunities can
be contested through three exceptions. There is international consensus that sitting highranking state officials including Heads of States, Heads of Governments, Vice Presidents, Prime
Ministers, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs are provided immunity for both functional and
personal activities. However, diplomats, current, and former high-ranking state officials share
three major exceptions to their immunity protections. These exceptions include; 1) if the
individual is being tried by an International Court, 2) if immunity is waived by officials
government by virtue of a treaty, or 3) the state the official represents gives its implied or explicit
consent for waiver of the officials immunity. The STL will be able to remove immunities for
accused high-ranking state officials if any of these exceptions are applicable.
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4. Under the first exception, for state official immunity, prosecution by an
international court, no explicit test for defining an international court exists
however factors emerge from case law that can be applied to the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon.
The level of authority vested to the STL can be determined by evaluating the
mode of establishment used to create the court, the explicit powers granted to it through
its statute, and the level of Security Council Support expressed during its creation. In
addition to these three factors, the historical background of the STL’s creation gives
further insight into the international nature of the tribunal. While the STL does not have
an explicit waiver of immunity in it’s statute, the Security Council established it by
passing an agreement for the court through its Chapter VII power. It was intended to be
an international court with the authority vested to it mirroring other international
tribunals.
Lebanon passes the threshold for being considered an “international” court under
these factors. The STL is characteristically very similar to other international hybrid
tribunals. However, the court will face challenges proving that its domestic subject
matter jurisdiction affords it the powers of other international courts to eliminate claims
of immunity from high-ranking state officials.
5. Evaluating the Courts characteristics of the STL including, title and
description, location, judicial composition, procedure and funding reveal that it is
a characteristically international hybrid tribunal.
Although the tribunal does not have the word “international” in its name other
factors weigh highly in it being an “international” tribunal. The courts judicial staff
composed of a majority of international judges, over half its funding comes from
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international sources, it uses international procedural methods and it is located in the
Hague, Netherlands. These attributes are all very similar to those embodied by other
international hybrid tribunals.

6. The Treaty for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was ratified by both
Lebanon and Syria, and is evidence of waiver of immunities by the Syrian
government. However, Syria will still be afforded the opportunity to try its
officials in its own domestic courts and is unlikely to give the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon precedence.
In addition to the waiver of immunity through the Treaty for the Suppression of
terrorist bombings, there is also an implicit waiver of immunities from Syria by treaty
through Articles 25 and 103 of the UN charter, which allow Security Council decisions,
such as the creation of the STL, to take precedence any treaty laws between two states.
This would require Syrian officials to comply with the requests of the STL and eliminate
immunities for their high-ranking state-officials being tried before the STL.
7. The volatile history between the Syria and Lebanon makes it doubtful that
Syria will explicitly waive immunities for its heads of state.
No current implicit of explicit waiver between Lebanon and Syria exists, and it is
unlikely that Syria will voluntarily renounce the immunity protections of any of
their high-ranking state officials.
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8. Two additional exceptions to immunity protections apply to former highranking state officials, these exceptions include removal for immunity for 1) acts
completed prior to or after the individual was in office and 2) acts complete
outside of the “official capacity” of the officials position.
Former high-ranking officials claims for immunity will likely not be upheld
because even if neither of the first two exceptions are applicable to the accuse, it is
unlikely that participating in a bombing that took 22 lives will be considered within the
“official capacity” of the individuals position. Former state officials will accordingly be
liable for all crimes committed outside of their “official capacity” while in office.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Background and Relevant Events Leading to the Creation of the STL

Syrian forces have occupied parts of Lebanon since April of 1975 when the then-Syrian leader
Hafez Al-Assad sent troops to strengthen the sitting Lebanese Christian Maronite government.2
The occupation was initiated in response to Lebanese-Palestinian warfare that was occurring, as
well as the internal political fighting between the Lebanese Christian Maronite community and
the leftist National Movement.3 Syrian troops stayed in Lebanon through two Israeli invasions
in 1978 and 1982. In October of 1989 under the Taif Accords, Lebanese Muslims were granted
a larger share of political power and “preferred relations” between Lebanon and Syria began,
Syria’s role as the “guarantor of Lebanon’s security” was defined in the agreement. After the
Taif Accords, Syria agreed to create a timetable for troop withdrawal from Lebanon by 1992,
2

Katherine Iliopoulos, Hariri Tribunal Opens in The Hague, Crimes of War Project (2009),
available at, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-lebanon.html. [available in
accompanying notebook 1 at tab 15].
3

Id.
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however this did not occur.4 In 1992 Rafiq Hariri became prime minister of Lebanon and in
2004 after the withdraw of Israeli forces, the Security Council passed the U.S. and France cosponsored U.N. Resolution 1559 with Hariri’s support.5 This resolution requests for “foreign
forces” to leave Lebanon, terminate any connection with Lebanese political affairs, and for the
disarmament of militias.6 Additionally, the UN Secretary General appointed a special envoy to
implement the Resolution, and with the aid of this envoy, Lebanese and Syrian officials began
meeting in early February of 2005 to discuss how to accomplish the requests of the Resolution.
There were several attacks on civilians and politicians from suspected Syrian supporters from the
time Hariri took office.7 On February 14 2005, the then former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri and 22 others were assassinated by a car bomb.8
Two years after the attack, the UN and Lebanon signed an agreement to create the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon to try those who were deemed responsible for the attack, and for

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices: Lebanon (February 23, 2001), available at,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/800.htm. [reproduced in accompanying notebook I
at tab 18]
.7 Id. (including an the bombing of a Maronie church in Beirut that killed one person and the
beating death of Akram Arbeed who was attacked while accompanying a candidate in the 1996
parliamentary election).
Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1061, 1062-63 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/melia_bouhabib/1.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 38].
8
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subsequent related attacks that resembled it in manner and purpose.9 The attacks the tribunal is
to address include any that happened between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, that the it
decides are “connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and ... of a nature
and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2004.”10 Crimes similar in nature that occur after
the specified dates may also be included if they are approved by a future agreement between the
UN and the Lebanese government, with the approval of the Security Council.11 The Lebanese
Parliament failed to ratify the agreement through its domestic legislative process by June 10th
2007. Desiring to establish the tribunal immediately the UN Security Council disregarded the
legislative stalemate and authorized the formation of the tribunal, under Chapter VII of the
Security Council powers with a vote of ten members approving and five abstaining.

12

The UN also initiated a fact-finding mission to the killing and the adequacy of the
subsequent Lebanese authorities’ investigation regarding the killing.13 It noted the possible role
of both Syrian Military Intelligence and some in leadership positions in the Lebanese Security
9

Id.

10

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab1].
Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1061, 1062-63 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/melia_bouhabib/1.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 38].
11

12

United Nations Security Council 5686 Meeting Record on the creation of the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, S/PV.5685 30 (May 2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 59].
Id. (finding that President Bashar Al-Assad had threatened Hariri just months before the
assassination, and determined that Syria bore the primary responsibility for the political tension
present before the assassination).
13
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Services in planning and implementing the attack. It also found that the investigation run by
Lebanon was critically defective.

14

Syrian officials and Lebanese Security services deny any

involvement or wrongdoing with the bombing, however President Bashar al-Assad stated that if
any Syrian were accused of being involved the individual would be brought to justice in Syria.15
The suspected involvement of high-ranking state officials both in the Lebanese and Syrian
governments will likely lead to several claims of state official immunity before the STL.
Accordingly, all possible claims of immunity and the exceptions to immunities for current and
former state officials must be evaluated.
B.

Legal Background
1.

General Overview: Doctrine of State Official Immunities

State official immunity represents a procedural bar to the ordinary jurisdiction of a court to
try individuals charged with crimes.16 The issue of state official immunity is one that addresses a
growing international tension of finding a balance between principles of sovereign equality and

Id. (stating that “[t]here is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian
security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their
counterparts in the Lebanese security services. . “).
14

15

Kim Ghattas, Lebanon's groundbreaking tribunal BBC News April 21 2006, last visited
11/15/09 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4926536.stm. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at tab 13 ].
16

Nsongurua J. Udombana , Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the International Criminal
Court, 13 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 1, 38 (2005). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab
48]
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upholding global justice.

17

Nations grant foreign high-ranking officials the amount of

immunity they deem is necessary to perform official duties without subjecting the official’s to
arrest or detention.18 Additionally, a survey of international case law reveals two main types of
immunities afforded to state officials, functional immunity, and personal immunity.19 State
officials are either afforded functional immunity protections or personal immunity protections, or
both, depending on the rank of their position and if they are current or formal officials.20
a)

Personal Immunity

The first form of immunity protections that may be afforded to a state official under an
immunity claim before the STL is personal immunity.21 This is also referred to an immunity
ratione persona, and it provides a complete bar from criminal prosecution in foreign jurisdiction
17

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2130 (1999). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 37 ].
18

Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 179 (1986) (listing in order from least to most broad
claims of immunity protections; the British granting a modified form of restrictive immunity
based on sovereign and diplomatic immunity, French courts granting a broad immunity to heads
of state based on their status as government officials that is similar to diplomatic immunity, the
Soviet Union and East European countries granting a broad degree of immunities to high-ranking
officials and in some cases absolute immunity). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab
42].
19

Katherine Iliopoulos, Hariri Tribunal Opens in The Hague, Crimes of War Project (2009)
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-lebanon.html .[reproduced in accompanying
notebook I at tab 15 ]
20

Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes? Some
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 853, 868 (2002)
(stating that while the two forms of immunity exist independently, they might also overlap if the
state official is holding office while he is being tried for crimes).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook II at tab 39 ].
21

Id.
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for state officials over any act they execute, both within and outside of their official duties.22
The rationale behind personal immunity protections is that any official receiving these
protections must be immune from foreign jurisdiction to insure foreign states do not: 1) infringe
on protected sovereign rights of a nation, or 2) interfere with the official functions of a state
official by claiming that the alleged crime was done as a private act.23
b)

Functional immunity

The second form of immunity protections that may be afforded to a state official under an
immunity claim is a functional immunity. This immunity from criminal prosecution is afforded
to state officials for cases arising in foreign jurisdictions. Functional immunity or immunity
ratione materiae is immunity provided to state officials for acts carried out as part of their
official duties for their state.

24

In general, functional immunities are provided to all ranking

state officials for acts carried out as part of their official duties for their state. The immunities
for their official acts exist both while they are in office and after they leave office.

25

The

22

Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 Eur. J. Int'l
L. 595, 601 (2001). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 51].
23

Cassese supra note 20. [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 39].

24

Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur. J. Int'l Law 853, 862 (2002). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook II at tab 39 ].
25

Id.
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reasoning behind affording functional immunity is that the state official acts are attributed
directly to the state, and, therefore, individual liability does not arise.
c)

26

Individuals who may claim immunity before the STL

The amount of functional or personal protections provided to each state official that
claims they are immune from prosecution before the STL will depend on what level of office the
individual holds and if they are currently in office. Individual’s claiming state official immunity
generally fall into one of four categories: 1) lower ranking state officials, 2) diplomats, 3) current
high ranking state officials, and 4) former high ranking state officials. Each category receives a
different level of protections in foreign courts, however diplomats, current, and former highranking state officials share three major exceptions to their immunity protections. Former highranking state officials may be criminally prosecuted under two additional exceptions.
(1)

Lower Ranking State Official Claims for Immunities

Personal immunity is afforded only to individuals in the highest positions of government
including and is not extended to lower ranking state officials.

27

The International Court of

Justice enumerated positions that receive immunity protections including; Diplomats, Heads of
State, Heads of Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs.28 Civil servants who do not work
in one of these positions, or a position with a similar level of responsibility are not granted
26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium),
2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14); see also ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, House of
Lords.[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 19 ]
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immunities for crimes they commit, as they do not personify the nations they serve in the same
capacity as a head of state does.29
(2)

Diplomats Claims for Immunities

Diplomats are afforded diplomatic immunity protections, which mirror the immunity
protections afforded to current high-ranking state officials. Diplomatic immunity is defined
under The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.30 “Official/Diplomatic agents” of a
nation’s diplomatic staff receive functional immunity in a receiving state for their “official
duties.” 31 Along with functional immunity protections, diplomatic immunity includes providing
personal immunity to diplomatic agents of a country.32 Analysis for diplomatic immunity is
approached in the same manner as current high-ranking state officials immunities, and diplomats
are subject to the same exceptions to immunity protections. However, the protections given to
diplomats for their private acts (personal immunity protections) are limited to the receiving states

29

Diego A. Archer, MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR -ISSUE 5: HEAD OF

STATE DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law War Crimes Research Project 32 (2003). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
III at tab 52 ].
30

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 29- 38, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3240-45, 500, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. at 3240, 500 UNT.S. at 112.[reproduced in accompanying
notebook I at tab 4].
31

Id.

32

Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur. J. Int'l Law 853, 862 (2002). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook II at tab 39 ]
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while personal immunity of High-ranking officials is not confined within the borders of a
receiving state and extends to all nations.33
(3)

High-ranking State Official Immunity Claims

High-ranking state official immunity law is defined and has evolved through customary
international law, because although international courts have addressed the topic no treaty has
been signed that clarifies or limits the scope of current and former high-ranking official
immunities.

34

Principles that are considered customary international law are those that are

broadly accepted by the international community and require the legal obligations of
enforcement from all nations.35 Historically, officials were afforded absolute immunity, such
that no state could be put on trial without its own consent.36 Absolute immunity protection was
founded on the idea of promoting sovereign equality, the concept that all states are equal and
independent under international law.

37

However, the current general rule is one of affording

restrictive immunity. Restrictive Immunity is the idea that states can be subject to foreign
33

Salvatore Zappal, Do Heads of State In Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The
Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 2 European Journal of International Law
[EJIL] 595, 599
(2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook III at Tab 51].
34

Michael A Tunks, 52 Duke L.J. 651, 653 Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of
Head-of-State Immunity (2002).[reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 47 ].
35

Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 176-77 (1986).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook III at tab 42].
36

Michael A Tunks, 52 Duke L.J. 651, 653 Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of
Head-of-State Immunity (2002).[reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 47 ].
37

Id.
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jurisdiction under certain circumstances.38 This theory was born out of the need to aid the
increasing involvement of states in commercial enterprises; however, it has also been applied
in criminal cases to ensure a denial of justice did not take place.39 Under the theory of
restrictive immunity, courts generally approached high-ranking state official immunity claims
by affording different levels of protections to 1) current high-ranking officials and 2) former
high-ranking officials.

40

Three exceptions limit both current and former high-ranking state official immunity
claims. The limitation of immunity is applicable when: 1) the high-ranking official is being
tried before an international court, 2) the immunity is waived by treaty, or 3) there is an explicit
or implicit waiver by the government of the state official’s immunity. In addition to the shared
exceptions to immunity for current and former high-ranking officials, courts find two further
exceptions exist for former high-ranking state officials. High-ranking officials who are no
longer in office do not receive immunity protections for things done while they were in office
that were outside of the scope of their position. Additionally, former high-ranking state
officials are not afforded protections for acts committed before or after their term in office.

38

Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal
Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press New York, NY 16
(2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 28 ].
39

Id.

40

Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur. J. Int'l Law 853, 862 (2002). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook II at tab 39 ]
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III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Lower Ranking State Officials Immunity Claims

The International Court of Justice first addressed the issue of current High-ranking
Official Immunities in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium (hereinafter the
Arrest Warrant).41 In the Arrest Warrant case, a Brussels court issued an arrest warrant for the
incumbent minister of foreign affairs of Congo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (hereinafter
Yerodia) for crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law that violated the
1949 Geneva Conventions for allegedly inciting the massacre of a Tutsi ethnic group in
Kinshasa.42 The Democratic Republic of Congo claimed that immunity protections for Yerodia
must be upheld because he was a current Minister of Foreign Affairs.43 As previously
mentioned, the International Court of Justice enumerated positions that receive immunity
protections including; Diplomats, Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers of
Foreign Affairs.44 Low ranking state officials who do not hold a position similar in
responsibility to those enumerated by the Arrest Warrant court will have no claims for immunity
before the STL, and may be fully prosecuted.
41

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium),
2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 19 ]
42

Arrest Warrant 41 I.L.M. 536, 541 ¶5 (2002) (including in the list of crimes delivering
speeches that incited racial hatred).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 19 ]
43

Arrest Warrant 41 I.L.M. 536, 541 ¶5 (2002). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at
tab 19]
44

Arrest Warrant 41 I.L.M. 536, 541 ¶5 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at II tab
19 ]; see also Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827
(H.L.).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 25].
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B.
Immunity Protections Afforded to Current High-ranking State Official and
Diplomats
Generally, personal and functional immunity protections for high-ranking state officials
are absolute in protection during criminal proceedings that are tried by third party foreign
courts.45 As previously mentioned, the protections and exceptions to protections for diplomats
mirror those afforded to current and former heads of state, however are limited to the diplomats
time in the receiving state.46 The court in the Arrest Warrant case defined the scope of current
high ranking state official immunity protections when it held in a final binding decision that the
international circulation of an arrest warrant by Belgium violated the foreign minister’s personal
immunity from criminal prosecutions.47 It then ordered Belgium to cancel the arrest warrant.48
The court said that it was only deciding the scope of immunity from criminal jurisdiction for an
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that it was doing so on the basis of international
customary law.49 Additionally, the court opinioned that immunities afforded to ministers of
Foreign Affairs are provided to enable individuals to fully perform their job requirements on
45

Diego A. Archer, MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR - ISSUE 5: HEAD OF
STATE DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS, CASE WESTERN RESERVE
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW WAR CRIMES RESEARCH PROJECT 35 (2003).[reproduced in
accompanying notebook III at tab 52 ].
46

Supra Diplomatic Immunities Background section of the memorandum.

47

Arrest Warrant 41 I.L.M. 536, 541 ¶5 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab
19]
48

United Nations Information Service, Press Release AFR/379
ICJ/602, ICJ REJECTS BELGIAN ARREST WARRANT FOR FOREIGN MINISTER OF
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, (February 15 2002), available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/afr379.html. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook I at tab 17 ]
49

Id.
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behalf of the nations they represent, and to successfully complete his job a minister of foreign
affairs throughout his time in office must be afforded full immunity, both personal and functional
from criminal jurisdiction.

50

As stated in the analysis of lower ranking state official claims for

immunity, the ICJ enumerated other positions that would need full personal and functional
protections while in office including; Diplomats, Heads of State, Heads of Government, and
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.51 These protections extend to other high-ranking state officials that
work in a similar capacity and at a similar level as a minister of foreign affairs, including highranking cabinet members or Ministers of Defense.52 After defining the scope of immunities
afforded to current high-ranking state officials, the court enumerated the exceptions to claims of
immunity both for a current and former high-ranking officials.53
Examples of providing both personal and functional immunities for current high-ranking
officials is reflected in several national court cases. A Spanish National Court (Audencia
Nacional) held that the president of Cuba, Fidel Castro, could enjoy complete immunity during
his time in office.54 A French court (Cour de Cassation) also held that Muammar al-Gaddafi the

50

Id.

51

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium),
2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14); see also ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, House of
Lords.[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 19 ]
52

United Nations Information Service, Press Release AFR/379
ICJ/602, ICJ REJECTS BELGIAN ARREST WARRANT FOR FOREIGN MINISTER OF
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, (February 15 2002), available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/afr379.html. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook I at tab 17 ]
53

Id.

54

Antonio Cassesse, When May Senior Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some
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President of Libya could not be held responsible for possible crimes he participated in while he
was a sitting head of state.55 Overall, there is an international consensus that sitting high-ranking
state officials including Heads of States, Heads of Governments, Vice Presidents, Prime
Ministers, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs are provided immunity for both functional and
personal activities.
C.

Exceptions for both Former and Current High-ranking Official Immunities

There are three general exceptions to the total personal and functional immunity
protections afforded to current high-ranking state officials and the functional immunity
protections afforded to former high-ranking officials. According to the court in the Arrest
Warrant case these exceptions include: 1) if the official is being tried by an international
tribunal, 2) if the home nation the official is representing or has represented waives immunity
through a treaty, or 3) if the home nation of the official waives the immunity through either
implicit or explicit consent.56

While the portion of the opinion defining exceptions was

considered obiter dictum, and only the judgment itself was binding on the parties of the case, it
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 853,
866 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 39].
55

Id.

56

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium),
2002 I.C.J. 3 ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) (stating the exceptions are 1) “such persons enjoy no criminal
immunity under international law in their own countries;” 2) they cease to enjoy immunity from
the jurisdiction of another state “if the State they represent or have represented decides to waive
that immunity;” 3) a former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be prosecuted by another state in
respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as
in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity;” and, 4)
“an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings
before certain international courts, where they have jurisdiction.” ).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook I at tab 19 ]
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still will significantly affect international law because ICJ Court cases are persuasive authority
for future decisions of UN created tribunals.57 If one of the three exceptions applies to a sitting
high-ranking state official, the STL may be able to supersede the immunity claim and prosecute
the accused.58
1.

Prosecution by an International Tribunal

The first exception to state official immunities occurs when an “international court” is
trying an accused. The Nuremburg Tribunal first explained the need for restrictive immunity and
the elimination of high-ranking state official immunity claims when the accused is being tried
before an international tribunal for crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against
peace.59 This groundbreaking international tribunal stated: “Crimes against international law
are committed by men, and not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”.60 More recently, The
ICJ voiced this same sentiment in the Arrest Warrant Case when it stated that while the courts of
a third state are bared from trying sitting or former heads of state, “certain international criminal
courts” may try these individuals where the international courts have jurisdiction.61 The court

57

Louis Henkin et. al., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 49 (2d ed.
1991) (discussing the Nicaragua case).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 29 ]
58

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium),
2002 I.C.J. 3 ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) [reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 19 ]
International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L.
172,221 (1946). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 21 ]
59

International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L.
172,221 (1946). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 21 ]
60
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did not define criteria for identifying “international courts,” but did distinguish them from a
“foreign jurisdiction” or a court of “one state.” 62 Additionally it gave examples of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the future International Criminal Court as such courts that do have
jurisdiction over individuals from a third party state.63 These examples enumerated by the court
all UN created tribunals, and like the STL the ICTY and the ICTR were created under the
Security Council’s chapter VII powers.
Additionally in the Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor case before the hybrid UN created
Special Court of Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor the former President of Liberia was indicted for
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international law including
terrorism.64 Taylor challenged the validity of his indictment by claiming that because it was
issued while he was still in office, and it was contrary to the immunity afforded to a head of state

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, (2008) (stating examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant
to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future
International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention.) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook III at tab 44 ]
61

62

Id.

63

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), Cour de Cassation (Fr.), Mar. 13, 2001,
Judgment No. 1414, reprinted in 105 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 473, para. 161 (2001).
64

Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-01-01-PT, (May 2007).[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at II tab 24 ]
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under international law.65 The court rejected his argument based on the Statutes of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals, the approach and authority vested in ad
hoc international criminal courts, the approach of the ICC, as well as the holdings in the Arrest
Warrant and Pinochet cases.66 The court stated that from viewing the evolution of immunities
afforded to high-ranking officials, "the principle seems now established that the sovereign
equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international
criminal tribunal or court."67
There is strong precedent for the denial of immunity claims when individuals are being
tried before UN created “international” courts, however there exists no bright line rule for
defining an “international court.” A survey of relevant case law reveals several factors that
courts balance to make determinations when the issue arises including: 1) the authority vested to
the court, 2) the characteristics of the court, and the 3) the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court.68 The STL has several distinctive attributes that no UN created court before it possessed.

65

Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 407, 416 (2004). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 35 ].
66

Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Immunity from Jurisdiction, No. SCSL-03-01-I (May 31,
2004).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 24 ].
67

Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Immunity from Jurisdiction, No. SCSL-03-01-I (May 31,
2004).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 24 ].
See Generally William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an
International Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal
of International Law 513, 514 (2008) (looking to the subtopic’s of Schabas’s article for direction
on factors).[reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 44 ]; See also International Center
for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR
LEBANON, 9-31 (April, 10 2008)(comparing and contrasting the STL to other international ad
hoc and hybrid tribunals).[reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 54 ]
54
68
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STL (2007)

ICTY (1993)

ICTR (1994)

SCSL (2002)

ECCC (2003)

ICC (2002)

ICJ

These characteristics raise new legal issues that must be addressed to determine if the STL, a
court of “international character” (as described by the Security Council in its creation) is also an
“international court.” These attributes include it being the first tribunal of international character
that: 1) will hear solely cases of crimes of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses, 2) with
subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to domestic law, and 3) who’s statute
does not eliminate state official immunity like other UN created tribunals before it. 69 To
determine if the STL is an international tribunal a comparison must be completed of the STL and
previous international UN created tribunals. The following is a visual comparative
representation of the STL, previous UN created hybrid and ad hoc tribunals, as well as the ICC
and the ICJ. Following the visual comparison, this memorandum will individually analyze each
component in a legal context.
a)

Visual Comparison of UN Created Tribunals

69 Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1061 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/melia_bouhabib/1. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 38]
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Mode of
Establishment

Agreement
between
Lebanon and
Security
Council not
Ratified in
Lebanon,
Security
Council uses
Chapter VII
Powers to
impose
agreement

Imposed by
Security
Council under
Chapter VII
Powers Resolution 827

Imposed by
Security
Council under
Chapter VII
Powers Resolution 955

Bilateral
Agreement/Treaty
between the
Security Council
and Sierra Leone

Bilateral
Agreement/Treaty
between the
General
Assembly and
Cambodia

Universal
Multilateral Treaty
- “Rome Statute of
the International
Criminal Court”

Universal
Multilateral Treaty
– Under Chapter
XIV of the Charter
of the United
Nations

Provision
Eliminating
High
Ranking
Official
Immunities
in Charter
Security
Council
Voting
Record
Title and
Description

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

10 Approve, 5
Abstain

15 Approve

13 Approve, 1
Abstains, 1
Disapproves

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

“Special”
Tribunal for
Lebanon

“International”
Court of Justice

All International

All International

Contributions
by All Member
States of the
UN as decided
by budgetary
bodies of the
General
Assembly
The Hague,
Netherlands
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Subject
Matter
Jurisdiction

Lebanese
Penal Code:
Terrorist
Attacks and
Assassinations

War crimes,
Genocide, and
Crimes Against
Humanity

b)

War crimes,
Genocide, and
Crimes Against
Humanity

War crimes,
Crimes Against
Humanity and
Domestic Crimes
(independent not
linked to the
domestic judicial
system)

War Crimes,
Genocide, Crimes
Against
Humanity and
Domestically
Defined Crimes
(linked to the
domestic judicial
system)

War Crimes,
Genocide, and
Crimes Against
Humanity for
individuals
referred by the
Security Council

Jurisdiction over
disputes between
or among states, no
jurisdiction over
violations of
international or
domestic criminal
law committed by
individuals

Level of Authority Vested to the STL

The level of authority vested to the STL can be determined by evaluating the mode of
establishment used to create the court, the explicit powers granted to it through its statute, and
the level of Security Council Support expressed during its creation. In addition to these three
factors, the historical background of the STL’s creation gives further insight into the
international nature of the tribunal. These combined aspects of the tribunal illustrate that the
STL has been vested a level of authority similar in scope to other international tribunals.
(1)

Mode of Establishment

Examining a court’s mode of establishment is one factor weighed in determining if the
authority vested into the court from the international community mirrors the levels afforded to
other international courts.70

The STL’s creation through the Security Council passing

agreement 1757 for the tribunal under its Chapter VII enforcement powers is unique from
methods used by other ad hoc or hybrid international tribunals. The forms of establishment for
70

Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 276 (2008). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook II at tab 34]
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previous UN created international tribunals includes a Security Council Resolution under
Chapter VII enforcement powers, an agreement between the UN and the nation the tribunal is
created for, and a multilateral universal treaty.
The Security Council representing the will of the international community established the
two ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR under its Chapter VII enforcement powers.71 This is a
valid method of establishment for an international tribunal because states through the Security
Council may choose to bring alleged perpetrators of crimes under international law before an
international tribunal instead of an International Court.72 This option is recognized in Article VI
of the Genocide Convention, the commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and through the
Nuremburg Judgment.73
The two hybrid tribunals, the SCSL and ECCC were created through a bilateral treaty
between the UN and the respective countries. The SCSL signed a treaty with the Security
Council and the ECCC with the UN General Assembly.74 These tribunals were not imposed on
the countries concerned like the ITCY and ITCR were; they instead were created with the
consent and at the request of each nation. It may be contested that the STL’s new method of
creation, through the UN Security Council passing an agreement under its Chapter VII powers

71

Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 276 (2008). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook II at tab 34]
Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Vol. 1, Transnational Publishers Inc., New York, NY 37
(1995). [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 31].
72

73

Id.

74

Id.
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that has not been ratified by Lebanon, is not a valid method of formation used by prior
international tribunals. That the Security Council overstepped its powers and forcibly passed a
treaty through its “peacekeeping” powers.75
Specifically, individuals with immunities claims may argue that because the Lebanese
Parliament has yet to approve the agreement, Lebanon itself does not endorse the tribunals and
the tribunal is invalid without the actual ratification of the agreement by the Lebanese
Parliament. In November of 2006, the United Nations Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel addressed
this issue when he spoke to the Security Council and stated,
“The Lebanese constitutional process for the conclusion of an agreement with the United
Nations has not been completed . . . major steps remain to be taken, in particular formal
approval by the Government, which is the prerequisite for the signature of the treaty and
its submission for parliamentary approval and, ultimately, its ratification.”76
Although the Security Council was forced to move the agreement to implementation
through its Chapter VII powers, it did not intend to bring the agreement into force as an
international treaty binding Lebanon but instead was complying with Lebanon’s request for a
tribunal to be created. Like the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC, and the SCSL, the STL was created after
careful consideration of the advantages and the disadvantages of the various options for
establishment.77 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora first approached the UN and requested the

75

Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter.shtml. ).[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab
11].
76

Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, 5 ICJ 1091, 1092 (2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 40 ].
77

Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol.
1, Transnational Publishers Inc New York, NY 79-81 (1998). ).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook II at tab 32 ]
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tribunal be created. It has not been adopted constitutionally by Lebanon because the Lebanese
Parliament has not approved the plan. One reason for the stalled approval of the tribunal in
Parliament is that the Lebanese Parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, will not convene the chamber to
address the tribunal’s creation.

78

In the Taylor Case, the appeals chamber of the SCSL also

faced a similar argument. The defense argued that a Security Council created agreement for a
tribunal between the Sierra Leone government and the UN was not supported by the will of the
Sierra Leone people because it although the agreement was ratified, it was not approved by a
popular referendum, and accordingly was not a legitimate international tribunal.79 The
prosecution countered that the agreement between Sierra Leone to create the tribunal and the UN
was representative of an agreement between Sierra Leone and all members of the UN, and that a
referendum was not needed.80 Additionally, that the agreement was a representation of the
overall will of the international community (including Sierra Leone) to try the crimes committed
in Sierra Leone at an international level, and the binding resolution trumped any lack of support
shown by the citizens of Sierra Leone through a referendum.81 It was held that the court was a
“truly international court” under this line of reasoning.

82

Like the SCSL the STL was also

78

Security Council 5685th Meeting (PM), Security Council authorizes establishment of special
tribunal to try suspects in assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Resolution 1757
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9029.doc.htm (2007) (Adopted by 10-0-5; China ,
Indonesia, Qatar, Russian Federation, South Africa Abstain).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook III at tab 58].
79

Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I), Appeal Chamber, 31 May
2004.[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 24 ]
80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.
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created by a request from the national government, however unlike Sierra Leone the Lebanese
government has not approved the creation of the tribunal.83 It may be argued that Lebanon does
not expressly disapprove of the tribunal, and that the will of the people is unknown only because
Nabih Berri is refusing to convene parliament and accordingly freezing the political process.84
Additionally, unlike the other tribunals that did not involve the respective governments in the
negotiations for their statutes, the Lebanese government has been actively involved in creating
the STL statute showing further support for the tribunal.85

Complying with Lebanon’s requests

the Council created the Resolution under its Chapter VII Article 39 powers of “promoting
international peace and security”, and did not forcibly ratify a treaty but instead established a
new international criminal jurisdiction.86
The mode of establishment for the STL will have implications on the enforcement
powers the tribunal holds, the Agreement and Statute for the STL binds Lebanon with tribunal
decisions, but are silent as to the tribunal’s powers to require states to comply with its orders and

83

Security Council 5685th Meeting (PM), Security Council authorizes establishment of special
tribunal to try suspects in assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Resolution 1757
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9029.doc.htm (2007) (Adopted by 10-0-5; China ,
Indonesia, Qatar, Russian Federation, South Africa Abstain).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook III at tab 58 ]
84

Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar, Lynn Maalouf, Early Reflections on Local Perceptions,
Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1065, 1074
(2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 49 ]
85

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 35 (April, 10 2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook
III at tab 54 ]
86

Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter.shtml. ).[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab
11 ]
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requests.87 Formation of a tribunal through a bilateral treaty affords the court no enforcement
powers for orders and requests outside of the states concerned with the tribunals.88

In contrast,

establishment through a Security Council imposed resolution binds all UN member states,
requiring them to comply with the tribunal’s orders under their Chapter VII enforcement powers.
It also allows the Security Council to enforce sanctions on states that do not comply with
requests of the tribunal.89

For the ICTY and ICTR Security Council Chapter VII enforcement,

powers apply to every portion of the Resolutions. For example, the ITCR statute states that
under the Secuirty Council chapter VII powers;

Trial

“. . . all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in
accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and
that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic
law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including
the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a
Chamber under Article 28 of the Statute, and requests States to keep the SecretaryGeneral informed of such measures;”90
For the STL Chapter VII enforcement powers apply only to the first paragraph of the

Tribunals Resolution 1757, and this paragraph does not address issues of requiring compliance
by third party states with the court’s decisions and requests.91 This paragraph states,

87

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 36 (April, 10 2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook
III at tab 54 ]
88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR
49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). [reproduced in accompanying
notebook I at tab 6].
91

Id.
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“Reaffirming its determination that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat
to international peace and security,
1. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that:
(a) The provisions of the annexed document, including its attachment, on the
establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall enter into force on 10 June
2007, unless the Government of Lebanon has provided notification under Article
19 (1) of the annexed document before that date;
(b) If the Secretary-General reports that the Headquarters Agreement has not been
concluded as envisioned under Article 8 of the annexed document, the locationof the
seat of the Tribunal shall be determined in consultation with the Government of
Lebanon and be subject to the conclusion of a Headquarters Agreement between the
United Nations and the State that hosts the Tribunal;
(c) If the Secretary-General reports that contributions from the Government
of Lebanon are not sufficient to bear the expenses described in Article 5 (b) of the
annexed document, he may accept or use voluntary contributions from States to
cover any shortfall.”92
Following the paragraph the Security Council attached the agreement between the
Council and Lebanon. This language only affords the Security Council’s chapter VII powers to
the establishment of the tribunal, requiring the agreement for the STL be entered into force.
Lack of enforcement powers may cause problems for the tribunal if it needs a nation to
extradite their officials so that they may be tried before the tribunal. Lebanon is the only nation
bound by Security Council resolution 1757 that is required to co-operate completely with
requests of the STL.93 Accordingly, it is possible that Syria, a third party state to the tribunal,
may choose not to carry out the requests of the court.94 This might cause problems with

92

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 1].
93

Katherine Iliopoulos, Hariri Tribunal Opens in The Hague, Crimes of War Project (2009),
available at, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-lebanon.html. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at tab 15].
94

Id.
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completing arrests or surrenders of Syrian nationals or any other nationals that belong to third
party States.95
(2)
Presence of Explicit Provision Eliminating High-ranking
Official Immunities in the Charter
Another reflection of the authority vested in the STL is the explicit powers granted to it
through its statute. All International Jurisdictions prior to the STL, including, the ICTY, ICTR,96
the Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts of Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court,
include a provision in their Statutes derived from the Statute of the International Military
Tribunal (Nuremburg) that specifically eliminates Head of State and state official immunity for
those being tried.97 The Nuremburg Charter Article 7 states: “the official position of defendants,
whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”98 The Nuremburg
principle has since been restated in the 1946 resolution of the General Assembly that affirmed

95

Id.

96

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, S.C. Res. 827,
UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, UN Doc. S/Res/827/Annex (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1192, 1194("The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility ...."); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6, S.C. Res.
955, UN SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 16, UN Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute] (same). [reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 5 ]
97

See Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1111 (2007).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 36 ]
98

See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminal of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 UNT.S. 280
(Aug. 8, 1945). (ARTICLE 7).[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab III ]
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the principles of international law recognized by the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
Judgment of the Tribunal.99
The Nuremburg provision in these jurisdictions bars protection for high-ranking state
officials from prosecution, responsibility, or mitigation of punishment for acts being prosecuted
by the tribunal.100 The Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has a provision in article 6
of the statute that states amnesty will not be a reason to bar prosecution; however, it mentions
nothing about excluding state official immunities. 101 It is possible that this was done
deliberately, because the elimination of immunity for state officials is typically reserved for
international crimes stricto senso and no traditional stricto senso crimes are being tried before
the STL. 102 The issue of whether the crimes being prosecuted at the STL are considered stricto
senso will be addressed in a later portion of this memorandum.
Syrian officials may also claim that the lack of a provision in the statute eliminating state
official immunity grants them this immunity in default.103 The Office of the Prosecutor can

99

Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal
Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press New York, NY 209
(2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 28 ]
100

See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminal of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 UNT.S. 280
(Aug. 8, 1945). (ARTICLE 7).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab ]
101

See Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1110-11 (2007).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab ]
102

See Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1111 (2007).[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 3 ]
103

See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminal of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 UNT.S. 280
(Aug. 8, 1945). (ARTICLE 7).[reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 3 ]
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argue that, although the STL does not have a provision in its statute eliminating high-ranking
state official immunities, the previous unfailing and frequent use of an immunity eliminating
clause in previous UN created tribunals signifies the consensus of the international community
that all individuals will be required to face justice in front of an international tribunal for the
most heinous crimes regardless of their official position.104 This makes it unnecessary for the
drafters of the STL tribunal’s statute to include explicit reference to exclusion of immunity
statute, as it has become customary in international criminal law for international tribunals to
prosecute individuals responsible for committing stricto senso crimes regardless of official
position.105 The Draft Code it is not binding authority in international law but is an authoritative
instrument that is evidence of customary international law, and it too reflects the need for to
eliminate of high-ranking state official immunities for international crimes.106 It States: "The
official position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of
mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility or mitigate punishment."107 Additionally, the Rome Statute of the International

104

Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State
Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States that are Not Parties to
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 463, 486 (2006)
).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 45 ]
105

Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal
Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press New York, NY 209
(2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 28 ]
106

Nsongurua J. Udombana , Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the International Criminal
Court, 13 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 1, 39-40 (2005). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III
at tab 48 ]
107

Id.
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Criminal Court specifically eliminates all immunities for individuals accused of all international
crimes. Article 27(1) of the Statute states:
“This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of
a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute.”108
These legal authorities and the explicit elimination of high-ranking official immunity in
the statutes of all UN created tribunals (with the exception of the STL) suggest that it has
become customary in international criminal law to eliminate state official immunity protections
for individuals being tried before UN created tribunals. Accordingly, it was not necessary to
include a provision in the statute of the STL, and the lack of one does not reduce the authority
vested to the tribunal by the members of the UN to try individuals regardless of their official
positions.
(3)
Level of Security Council Support for the Creation of the
tribunal
The level of Security Council support during the creation of the tribunal is also reflective
of the implicit authority vested to the STL by the international community. The Security Council
must vote to establish a tribunal under its Chapter VII powers, and during the creation of
Resolution 1757 for the STL; five Security Council members abstained from voting.109 It may
be contested that the five abstentions reflect the apprehensions of Security Council members that
108

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27(1), UN Doc. A/ CONF.183/9
(1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1017 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at tab 9 ]
109

United Nations Security Council 5686 Meeting Record on the creation of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, S/PV.5685 30 (May 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at
tab 59 ]
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the Council is exceeding its authority and interfering into strictly domestic Lebanese issues.
Additionally, that the voting record is proof that the STL is not a legitimate international tribunal
created from a Security Council supported resolution.110 The ICTY was established through
Resolution 827 under chapter VII of the UN charter by a unanimous vote in the Security
Council.111

The Security Council passed resolution 955 that created the ICTR with one

member voting against its creation and one abstaining. 112 It is arguable that the ICTR vote of
no support coupled with an abstention is stronger evidence of the lack of international agreement
for the tribunal, than the five abstentions present in the creation of the STL. However, in
addition to the five votes of abstention council members cautioned that the implementation of the
STL could have serious political repercussions. Despite of these concerns, the STL Resolution
was pushed forward and legitimately passed like the ICTY and ICTR, and without any members
of the Council voting against its implementation. Like the ICTY and the ICTR, the UN views
the STL as a legitimate Security Council backed international tribunal.113 A further examination
of the history behind its creation better defines the authority vested in the STL.
c)

History of Establishment

Several events leading up the implementation of the STL contribute to the conclusion that
it was intended to be an “international” tribunal capable of eliminating state official immunity
110

Id.

111

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 36 (April, 10 2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III
at tab 54 ]
112

Id.

113

Id.

44

Heather Ludwig
War Crimes Lab Fall 2009
Office of the Prosecutor Special Tribunal for Lebanon
claims. The prime minster of Lebanon referred to the STL as being a “tribunal of an
international character” in his letter on December 13th, 2005 to the Secretary General of the
United Nations that launched the process of the tribunal creation.114 The Security Council and
the Secretary General of the United Nations continued to use the term, “tribunal of an
international character” in various other official documents and reports when referring to the
STL.115 For example, the Secretary General in a Report to the Security Council specifically
stated that a purely national tribunal would not be able to fully prosecute those accused of the
assassination and other acts being tried.116 However, the Secretary General also pointed out in
his report that a purely international tribunal would not give enough responsibility to Lebanon
for achieving justice in crimes that affect Lebanon primarily.117 This designated the tribunal as
a hybrid form of court but did little to clarify the definition of a court of “international
character.” After this report, the Security Council requested the Secretary General negotiate
the establishment of a tribunal of “international character.”118 The Secretary General acted
accordingly and published a second report with the draft agreement between the UN and
Lebanon for the new tribunal, and directly addressed the concept of developing a “tribunal of

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 514 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 44 ]
114

115

Id. (proposing Lebanon would have a tribunal that is an international or internationally
assisted tribunal based on an agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon).
116

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644 (2005) UN Doc.
S/2006/176 (2006). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 56 ]
117

Id.

118

Schabas supra note 110 at 515 [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 44 ]
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international character.” 119 In this report, he stated that although features of international
character were not specifically discussed in the statute,
“The legal basis for the establishment of the special tribunal is an international agreement
between the United Nations and a Member State; its composition is mixed with a
substantial international component; its standards of justice, including principles of due
process of law, are those applicable in all international or United Nations-based criminal
jurisdictions; its rules of procedure and evidence are to be inspired, in part, by reference
materials reflecting the highest standards of international criminal procedure; and its
success may rely considerably on the cooperation of third States. While in all of these
respects the special tribunal has international characteristics, its subject matter
jurisdiction or the applicable law remains national in character, however.” 120
The Secretary General established through this statement the several attributes of the STL
that mirror other international criminal tribunals. However, he also expressed that the subject
matter (including terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit
associations and failure to report crimes and offences) of the tribunal and the applicable law
(the Lebanese Criminal Code) were national in character.121
These combined events demonstrate the UN’s opinion that the STL is similar to other
international tribunals with the exception of its subject matter jurisdiction, which only covers
crimes defined under the Lebanese Penal Code. The next sections of this memo will evaluate
if the STL can be considered “international” by definition even if its subject matter and

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 515 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab ]
119

120

Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon UN
Doc. S/2006/893 (2006).. (emphasis added)[reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 57
]
William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 516 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 44 ]
121
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applicable law is national in character, either because the nature of the crimes being tried are
international or because of other international characteristics that supersede the tribunals
national traits.122
d)

Characteristics of The Special Tribunal for Lebanon

In addition to evaluating the authority vested to the tribunal, the “characteristics” of the
court may be assessed to determine if the STL is an “international” tribunal capable of
eliminating high-ranking official immunity claims. The characteristics of a court include its title
and description, the composition of its judges and staff, its sources of funding, and location.123
When evaluating these characteristics for the STL it is important to compare its attributes to
previous UN created ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. The characteristics of the STL are evaluated
along with the level of authority vested to the court and the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court (which will be discussed in a later portion of this memorandum) to determine if it is an
“international” tribunal capable of eliminating immunity claims.
(1)

Title and Description of the Court

The first characteristic of the tribunal that aids in determining if it is “international” is its
title and description. Unlike several other previous UN sponsored criminal tribunals the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon does not have the word “international” in its title. In contrast, the

122

Id.

123

See Generally International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK
9-31 (April, 10 2008)(comparing and contrasting the
STL to other international ad hoc and hybrid tribunals).[reproduced in accompanying notebook
III at tab 54].
ON THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON,
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International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda all
include the term “international” in their titles.124 In Prosecutor v. Taylor a similar legitimacy
argument was brought before the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), which along with the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is
also missing “international” in its name. The Appeals Chamber attached little significance to
distinctions in the titles of the tribunals, and held that a “Special Court” is equivalent in status to
other UN backed international tribunals with the word “international” in their title.125 Similarly,
the STL uses the designation of “special” in its title and was created by UN. It is unlikely that
the lack of the term “international” in its title will delegitimize it as an international tribunal.
(2)

Judicial and Staff Composition of the Court

The second factor used for evaluation to determine if the STL is an “international”
tribunal is the composition of its judges and staff. A comparison of the Judicial Composition
of the STL reveals that it is similar to UN created hybrid tribunals. In the ICTY and the ICTR
ad hoc tribunals, all of the judges are international with no national judges serving in the
Chambers.126 The statute that establishes the STL states that the chambers must be composed

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 514 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook III at tab 54 ].
124
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Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, A.
Ch., 31May 2004. [reproduced in accompanying notebook II at tab 24 ]
126

Security Council 5685th Meeting (PM), Security Council authorizes establishment of special
tribunal to try suspects in assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Resolution 1757
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9029.doc.htm (2007) (Adopted by 10-0-5; China ,
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of at least 11 independent judges and no more than 14 judges. Additionally, the judges on the
STL must serve in the following capacities: 1) a single international judge as the Pre-Trial
Judge, 2) three judges in the Trial Chamber, one who is Lebanese and two who are
international, 3) in the event of the creation of a second Trial Chamber, that Chamber must be
staffed in the same international to national ratio as the first defined Trial Chamber, 4) five
judges must serve in the Appeals Chamber, including two Lebanese judges and three
international judges, and there must be 5) two alternate judges, one who is Lebanese and one
who is international.127 It could be argued that because the STL’s judicial body (the
Chambers) does not consist of an international judicial staff it is not a characteristically
international tribunal. However, the ECCC and SCSL hybrid tribunals do not have an entirely
international judicial staff and are considered characteristically international. In the chambers
of the SCSL, the majority of the judges are international with the minority being from Sierra
Leone, and at the ECCC, the majority of the judges are national with a minority being
international.128 It is noteworthy that like the SCSL, the majority of judges in each of the trial
and appeals chambers of the STL must be international. The STL chambers employ more
“international” judges than the ECCC, and its similarity in composition to the SCSL makes it
characteristically “international.”

Indonesia, Qatar, Russian Federation, South Africa Abstain) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook III at tab 58 ]
127

Id.
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Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (2008). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 34 ].
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In addition to the Chambers, there are three additional bodies of employees that perform
different functions these include, the Registry, Prosecutor, and Defense office.129 The STL’s
register is an employee of the United Nations who receives aid from the UN Office of Legal
Affairs.130 The prosecutor for the STL is chosen from a selection panel that is appointed by the
Secretary-General, Lebanon will get to choose the deputy-prosecutor.131 The ECCC was the first
tribunal to use the method of choosing a prosecutor through a panel, and the STL is the only
tribunal to follow its example. It could be contested that the selection of a prosecutor through a
panel is not transparent process, additionally the presence of a national deputy prosecutor is
evidence that the SCL is not an international tribunal. However, the use of a selection panel
arguably allows for the selection of a more impartial and professional tribunal staff.132
Moreover, a domestic deputy prosecutor was used in the ECCC and was proposed at the
SCSL.133 The Prosecutor selection process and composition is similar to other international
tribunals.
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See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC.
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). (defining throughout the different bodies of the tribunal and their
functions) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]
130

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]
131

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 35–38 (April, 10 2008). reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 54].
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The STL is the first to include the office of the defense as a fourth “organ” of the court.134
Under the STL statute the defense office has the same status as the prosecutor, the chambers, and
the registry. 135 Including the defense office as an organ of the court ensures defendants will be
afforded a more effective defense than other tribunals because defendants will have more access
to court finances and resources. Like other UN tribunals, the UN Secretary-General, in
consultation with the STL’s president, appoints the head of the STL Defense Office.136 Overall,
the defense office is more arguably more international in nature than the Defense Offices of
other UN backed tribunals because the office is included as an official organ of the court.
(3)

Funding Sources

The funding scheme for the STL is the third characteristic that is weighed to determine if
the tribunal is characteristically “international.” The ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals are
subsidiary bodies of the Security Council and report directly to it; accordingly, the two tribunals
receive their funding in the same manner as other UN established program activities.137 Every
expense for the ICTY and ICTR is reviewed and funded by all of the Member States of the UN,
and a budgetary body in the General Assembly determines each member state’s contribution.138
In comparison, the SCSL and the ECCC are funded by voluntary contributions of UN Member

Id.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 279 (2008)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 34 ]
134
135

138

Id.
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States, and do not receive contributions from the general UN budget.139 The STL’s funding
scheme is similar to the funding systems used by the SCSL and the ECCC. Unlike the ad-hoc
international tribunals, the STL is not funded by regular contributions to the United Nations, and
it will not be required to report to the UN General Assembly.140 The STL will be funded 49% by
voluntary contributions of nation states, and 51% by Lebanon.141
In addition, if the appropriate amount of voluntary funding cannot be acquired the
Security Council may explore other means of financing. 142 Individuals claiming immunity may
argue that this funding scheme allows for further funding to come from Lebanon, and that a
tribunal that receives the majority of its funding from the Lebanese’s Government is not
international, but instead a domestic court. However, it is likely that the Security Council put
this provision in the agreement to leave open the possibility of funding from the UN general fund
like the SCSL has received or from other interested UN member donors.143 The SCSL and the
ECCC have both had difficulties raising funds for the tribunals; this funding uncertainty may

139

Id.

140

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 15 (April, 10 2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab ][reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 54]
141

Id. at 16.
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Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007). (May 30, 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 5].
143

International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 16 (April, 10 2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 54]
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lead to delays in the judicial process.144 Requiring Lebanon to contribute a set amount, while
still allowing for flexibility in the funding percentage from donors will ensure the tribunal does
not face the same financial difficulties that other voluntarily funded UN tribunals have faced.
Additionally, Syria may argue that the large contribution of funding to the STL by the
Lebanese government reduces the accountability and impartiality of the court, and prosecutions
and convictions will be largely guided by Lebanese - not International interests. However, like
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the STL has a management committee composed of its major
international donors that provides policy advice and direction for the non-legal aspects of the
court.145 This body can insure that the use of funding reflects the needs of the international
community that created the tribunal.146 Current members of the Management Committee include
the United Kingdom (the committee chair), Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, France,
and Lebanon.147 The Secretary-General of the UN is also an ex-officio member of the
Committee, the Secretary-General does not vote on Management Committee Decisions, but adds
an additional degree of impartiality and international character to the STL.148 The management
committee is required to report on a regular basis to the “Group of Interested States,” an
assembly of nations that are interested in knowing about the happenings of the tribunal but may
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Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 280 (2008). reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 34].
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not necessarily support its work.149 Syria or any other UN member state may join this group if it
is concerned with the financial influence of the STL’s funding scheme. The management
committee may also expand its membership if any additional considerable donors wish to
participate. The funding system for the STL is very similar to the voluntary donor systems used
by the ECCC and the SCSL, and although Lebanon is required to contribute 49% of the funding
for the tribunal the accountability provided by the Management Committee will ensure that its
funds are used to achieve impartial international justice.
(4)

Location of the Courts Headquarters and Offices

The location of the STL is the forth factor evaluated when determining if the tribunal is
characteristically “international”. The principal judicial organs of the UN, the International
Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court are all located in The Hague,
Netherlands.150 The placement of these judicial organs couple with the inability to hold a
tribunal in a war torn nation prompted the placement of the ICTY in The Hague as well.151 Like
the ICTY, the ICTR was established soon after a war and its main office is located outside of the
nation, in Arusha, Tanzania but it still staffs a field office in Kigali, Rwanda.152 In contrast, the
SCSL and the ECCC are located in the borders of the concerned countries. The STL’s location
is most similar to the ICTR, with its headquarters stationed outside of Lebanon in The Hague,
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Netherlands and a field office in Beirut, Lebanon.153 In Article 8 of the Security Council
Agreement for the STL it states that the Tribunal shall specifically have its “seat” outside of
Lebanon to insure that justice, fairness, security and administrative efficiency (which includes
upholding the rights of witnesses and victims).154 The tribunal consequently signed a
“headquarters agreement” with the Netherlands through the UN legal counsel to keep the
headquarters in The Hague throughout its existence.155 The headquarters location of the STL
mirrors the placement of multiple other UN created international courts, including the ICJ, the
ICC, the ICTY, and the Appeals Chamber for the ICTR.156
It may be argued that because the STL has an office in Lebanon that total impartiality
will not be achieved. In the Security Council agreement, it states that the purpose of the
Lebanon office is to further investigations.157

However, it is possible that it could also be used

conduct trials of the accused, and this could lead to a slippery slope of all trials eventually being
held in Lebanon under the Lebanese Penal Code, an event that would eliminate its
“international” characteristics.158

It is unlikely that any trials will be held in Lebanon because
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International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 12 (April, 10 2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 54]
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Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1]
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International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Program, HANDBOOK ON THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, 12 (April, 10 2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 54]
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Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1 ]
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of the need for high levels of security. In international tribunals that prosecute high-ranking state
officials, it is necessary to keep the trial of high-ranking officials who still have supporters
outside of the nations boarders. The need to conduct trials in a location outside of a nation was
addressed during the Charles Taylor trial at the SCSL. The decision to move Taylor’s trial from
Sierra Leone to The Hague occured to ensure the existing Taylor supporters in Sierra Leone
would not use violent means to delay or enable to the trial from occurring.159
As previously discussed in the background portion of this memorandum the current
political environment of Lebanon is heated, and holding prosecutions in the Lebanon Beirut
office is improbable.160 The divisions and tensions among the groups of Lebanon has already
lead to violence and killings, and the increased security risks of holding a trial in Lebanon would
make a functioning court almost impossible.161 The location of the STL is characteristically
international because of the limited function of the Beirut office and the headquarters of the
tribunal being located out of the country in The Hague, Netherlands.

Reporting, Mar. 23,
2007, at 1, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=334328&apc_state=henpacr. reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 14 ]
Id. (“While other trials conducted by the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra
Leone, SCSL, have taken place in Freetown, the court is trying Taylor at the premises of the
International Criminal Court, ICC, in The Hague. The decision to locate the trial in The Hague
was taken in the interests of keeping the peace in Sierra Leone and the wider region.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 76].
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Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 279 (2008) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 34]
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(5)

Procedural Law of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

All of the UN created tribunals listed in the visual comparison section of this
memorandum use very similar procedural laws.162 Each tribunal’s procedural laws are based on
the international standards of justice and due process that was inspired by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.163 Even though the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the
first international tribunal to apply only domestic law, the procedural rule of the tribunal will also
be required to replicate international standards of justice and due process.164 This factor weighs
favorably in the determination that the STL is an international tribunal.
When comparing the characteristics of the STL to other UN created tribunals, it is
apparent that its characteristics are very similar to other UN created tribunals before it. The traits
of the courts will likely not give rise to concerns that characteristically it is not an international
tribunal. However, the subject matter jurisdiction of the court may become a seriously contested
factor in determining if the STL is an international criminal tribunal for individuals with
immunity claims before the court.

e)

162

Subject Matter Jurisdiction for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Id. at 278.
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The subject matter jurisdiction of a court is also evaluated to determine if the tribunal has
the ability to prosecute crimes similar to other international tribunals, and is therefore
intrinsically “international.”165 The STL may be characteristically similar to a hybrid tribunal,
however the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction is unlike any previous UN created
tribunals.166 The Special Court for Sierra Leone and The Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts
of Cambodia like the STL have jurisdiction over domestic crimes, however the SCSL and the
ECCC also have jurisdiction over international crimes.167 The STL’s jurisdiction is for crimes
defined only by a domestic source, The Lebanese Penal Code (LPC) 168, and the tribunal is not
trying traditional “international” crimes under the Lebanese Penal Code.169 Included in the
jurisdiction of the tribunal are acts of terrorism, crimes, and offenses against life and personal
integrity, illicit associations, and failure to report crimes and offences defined under the
Lebanese Penal Code.170 The Tribunal’s lack of jurisdictional power over international crimes
may be a major problem for the Office of the Prosecutor, because high-ranking state official

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 517 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44]
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Id.
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Nidal Nabil Jurdi, THE SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR
LEBANON, 5 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 1125, 1126 (2007).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
41]
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Id.

169

Schabas supra note 150. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44 ]
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Jurdi supra note 152.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 41 ]
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immunities have not historically been waived for individuals that commit domestic crimes.171
However, if the acts of terrorism being tried at the STL are considered international in nature,
states may be obligated to prosecute or extradite officials to be tried at the tribunal and this will
reduce the availability of immunity claims.172
(1)

Terrorism Defined Under the Lebanese Penal Code

The portions of the Lebanese Penal Code included in the subject matter jurisdiction of the
tribunal are; Articles 270, 271, 314, 335, 547, 548 and 549 of the LPC and Articles 2, 4, 5 and 6
of the ‘Law dated January 11 1958. This portion of the Lebanese Penal Code (LPC) defines
terrorist acts as those activities, “intended to create a state of panic committed by using such
means as explosives, inflammable materials, toxic or incendiary products, and infectious and
microbial agents that cause public danger.” 173 Hariri’s assassination was committed by using
explosives and will be considered an act of terrorism under the LPC if it can be proven that the
accused intended to create a state of fear among the Lebanese public.174 Assuming the Hariri
assassination was an act of terrorism as defined by the LPC, the act must also be classified as an

171

Id.

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, (2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44]
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Issam Michael Saliba, International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri assassination:
A Novel Development in International Criminal Law, The Law Library of Congress 5 (2007)
available at www.loc.gov/law/help/hariri/hariri.pdf. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 16].
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international crime either independently or under the broader subset of “crimes against
humanity” to eliminate the immunities of accused state officials before the STL.175
(2)
Terrorism as an independent international crime defined by
a treaty or through customary international
A crime may be defined as “international” either because a treaty labels it as such, or
because they are universally accepted through customary international law.176 In general,
international crimes are forms of conduct so egregious that those who engage in the acts are
considered “enemies of all man kind,” and accordingly all nations of the world have an interest
in insuring they are prosecuted.177 The idea that certain crimes are “international” stems back to
the Nuremberg trials where Justice Jackson explained the authority to try certain crimes existed
because, “those acts which offended the conscience of our people… (were) criminal by standards
generally accepted in all civilized countries.”178 Making this assertion Jackson cited the historic
precedent to criminalize these crimes including the Hague Conventions of 1907 that discussed
prosecuting war crimes as a part of the “laws of humanity”, the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928
renouncing war, and the Geneva Protocol of 1924 which declared wars of aggression as
175

Issam Michael Saliba, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, NATIONAL CRIMES AND THE HARIRI
ASSASSINATION: A NOVEL DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2007), available
at www.loc.gov/law/help/hariri/hariri.pdf.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 16 ]
William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 517 (2008). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44 ]
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Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2134-53 (1999).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 37 ]
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Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President on Atrocities and War Crimes, (June 7, 1945).
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbmenu.htm [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at 55 ]
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international crimes.179 Since Nuremberg, several other tribunals have voiced opinions about the
power of tribunals both national and international to try stricto senso crimes.
Before the nineteenth century, nations used this concept to justify the prosecution of
piracy.180 Currently there are three widely recognized “international” or stricto senso crimes.
Stricto Senso international crimes include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
181

The crimes being tried before the STL including; terrorist acts, crimes of illicit association,

and offenses against life and personal integrity are generally not considered part of the historic
list of stricto senso crimes.182 However, an international trend is emerging that suggests
terrorism should also be included on the list.
(a)
Terrorism an International Crime as defined by a
treaty
In addition to the universal jurisdiction granted to stricto senso crimes, treaties authorize
universal jurisdiction over additional crimes. Crimes granted jurisdiction by treaties include
torture, hostage apprehension, and hijacking crimes. The grant of universal jurisdiction created
by these international documents suggests that perpetrators of these crimes, like those who
commit stricto senso crimes, are “enemies of mankind” and are condemned by the international

Michael P. Scharf and Michael A. Newton, “Terrorism and Crimes against Humanity” in
Leila Sadat, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (forthcoming). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at 30]
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Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2134 (1999).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 37]
181

See Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1110-11 (2007).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 36 ]
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community.183 In addition to torture, hostage apprehension, and hijacking criminal treaties, there
conventions and treaties against terrorism, which require member states to prosecute or extradite
the accused to a forum where they can be prosecuted.
International support for combating acts of terrorism through treaties began as early as
1926 when the International Congress of Penal Law recommend that the Permanent Court of
International Justice should have the power to “judge individual liabilities” that happened as a
result of international offenses that were “a threat to world peace”.184 This idea died, however
similar suggestions of including terrorism as an international crime tried under universal
jurisdiction have been made throughout the following years.185 Once suggestion came from the
French government to the League of Nations that the ICC would be the best forum for trying
political crimes of an international nature, and an international convention on the suppression of
terrorism should be created to initiate the process.186 In 1937, a Conference for the Repression of
Terrorism met and collaborated to adopt a Convention of an International Criminal Court to
address terrorist acts.187 Although this treaty was rejected the idea before it was ratified, every
183

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2134 (1999).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 37 ]
Michael P. Scharf and Michael A. Newton, “Terrorism and Crimes against Humanity” in
Leila Sadat, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (forthcoming), citing Voeau of the International
Congress of Penal Law Concerning an International Criminal Court (Brussels, 1926), reprinted
in Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,Memorandum
Submitted by the Secretary-General 74, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.1 (1949) (Translating the
original French text found in Premier congres international de droit penal, Actes du congres
634). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30 ]
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multilateral anti-terrorism convention adopted since has adhered to the pattern used by the
Conference and has defined specific terrorist acts as violations of international law.188 In 1994,
the General Assembly Resolution on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” provided a
general definition of terrorism stating:
“[c]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify
them.189
Currently, several multilateral anti-terrorism conventions exist that focus on the domestic
enforcement of terrorism through international cooperation. However, acts of transnational
terrorism, like the Hariri assassination, are becoming a serious problem and defining terrorism as
an international crime to bring offenders to justice is now a priority in nations across the
globe.190 The large number of existing terrorism treaties is a reflection of this priority of
combating terrorism worldwide. However, none of the conventions specifically refer to
terrorism as an international criminal offense.191
(b)
Terrorism as an International Crime as defined by
customary international law

188
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Id., citing G.A. Res. 49/60, Dec. 9 1994, para. I.3.
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As previously mentioned, principles that are considered customary international law are
those that are broadly accepted by the international community and require the legal obligations
of enforcement from all nations.192 Combating grave crimes under customary international law
reflects international community interests about protecting higher norms of justice when they
come into conflict with the rules of immunity.193 The previous section of analysis on terrorism
as defined by a treaty provides several examples of the acceptance by the international
community for the need to combat terrorism. In addition, the UN General Assembly has voiced
its opinion that “any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of motivation,
whenever and by whomsoever committed and are unequivocally condemned,194 there have also
been proposals to include terrorist crimes in the Statute of the ICC.195 Currently, the UN
Security Council requires member nations of the UN to “accept and carry out” resolutions that
combat “terrorism,” but has yet to define what those terms mean.196
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Domestic court cases may aid in determining if a trend exists in customary law of
defining terrorism as a stricto senso international crime. A few national courts recently
expressed support for an exception to state official immunity protections for crimes that are so
egregious, that not prosecuting the individuals responsible would violate widely understood
norms of justice.197 Included in these national cases is a US court case, Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, where the court held that international law does not recognize an act of
torture as a sovereign act.198 It may be argued that unlike torture, a bombing which took the
lives of 22 individuals by car bomb is not extreme enough to be defined as “international.”
Those claiming state immunities before the STL might use the Qaddafi case as evidence of this
assertion. In the Qaddafi case, the leader of Liberia, Muammar Qaddafi (hereinafter Qaddafi),
was sued in France for his government’s participation (complicity) in a terrorist bombing, which
lead to the crash of a French UTA aircraft over Africa, and the loss of the 170 French civilian
lives.199 The court held that no matter how serious the crime of terrorism Qaddafi was being
charged with was, it did not fall into one of the exceptions to immunity claims for current foreign
Heads of State.200 However, the court in its decision failed to give any explanation why

William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 517 (2008)(including other cases, from Greece, Prefecture of Voiotia v.
Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany) ). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 44 ]
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198
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Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), Cour de Cassation (Fr.), Mar. 13, 2001,
Judgment No. 1414, reprinted in 105 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 473 (2001). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 19]
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terrorism is not an international crime.201 If terrorism is not yet specifically categorized as an
international crime by either customary or treaty law, it may be argued that some acts that
amount to terrorism can be considered crimes against humanity because of their intrinsic gravity
and odious consequences on the lives and assets of innocent civilians.202 Apart from of the
Qaddafi case, a general overall trend in of national courts to willingly expanding the traditional
list of stricto senso crimes to include other grave offenses such as torture, or particularly
abhorrent acts of terrorism is emerging.
(3)

Terrorism as a crime against humanity

The STL Office of the Prosecutor may also argue that the acts of terrorism being tried
before the STL can be included as crimes against humanity under the category of “other
inhumane acts.”203 Crimes against humanity are criminal acts that when taken together equate to
“a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”204

In the Prosecutor
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Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 595, 601 (2001). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 51 ]
202

Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 595, 601 (2001). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 51 ]
Michael P. Scharf and Michael A. Newton, “Terrorism and Crimes against Humanity” in
Leila Sadat, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (forthcoming). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 30 ]
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Id. (listing the following acti rei as crimes against humanity and proffering internationally
accepted definitions of key terms within the specified offenses: Murder; Extermination;
Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture;
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable group or
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v. Stanislav Galic the court of The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
held that, “the prohibition against terror is a specific prohibition within the general prohibition of
attack on civilians, the latter of which constitutes a peremptory norm of international law.”205
This holding supports the idea that certain singular acts of terrorism are a part of a greater
widespread systematic attack on a civilian population, and may be considered crimes against
humanity. Individuals responsible for the Hariri attack may argue that the bombing was not part
of a systematic attack on the civilian population of Lebanon, but was instead an isolated political
event. However, as depicted in the Background section of this memorandum a long history of
violence has affected Lebanon, and many of the attacks are attributed to the Syrian government’s
attempts to remain in control of the Lebanese political system.206 The terrorist bombing being
adjudicated by the STL is arguably a continuation of this violent history, and is part of a
systematic plan of aggression on the Lebanese civilian population. Additionally, the ICTY
holding supports the idea that an attack like the Hariri bombing that is expressly intended to

collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
205

Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement and Opinion
¶ 66, 94-100 (Dec. 5 2003), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/galtj031205e.pdf . [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23 ]
206
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provoke terror in the civilian population or political structure of a nation does not comport with
the laws and customs of war, and is a crime against humanity.207
(4)
Can a court be considered International in Nature if it only
tries domestically defined crimes?

Characteristically international hybrid tribunals are provided jurisdiction to try both
domestic and international crimes, however the STL’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to
crimes defined under the Lebanese Penal Code.208 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia has jurisdiction over both domestic and international crimes, and is part of the
Cambodian domestic court system.209 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also has
jurisdiction over both domestic crimes under Sierra Leonean law and international crimes.210
In contrast, the SCSL is an independent judicial body and is not linked to the domestic judicial
system.211 It is arguable that because the STL lacks jurisdiction for any traditionally
international crime it is not an international tribunal.
Additionally, the domestic crimes involving “terrorism” being tried at the STL are graver
and more universally shunned than the domestic crimes of “setting fire to public buildings” or

207

Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T (Dec. 5 2003). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 53 ]
208

Larry D. Johnson, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LECTURE: UN-Based International Criminal
Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (2008). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 34 ]
209
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“abduction of a girl for immoral purposes” being tried at the SCSL. 212 Accordingly, the court
must be afforded universal jurisdiction to eliminate immunity claims of the accused to achieve
justice. 213 However, while the SCSL does have subject matter jurisdiction over the abovedescribed domestic crimes, actual SCSL prosecutions focus on crimes against humanity,
violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and other
serious violations of international humanitarian Law. To date, no individuals have been
charged at the SCSL under Article 6, which spells out domestic offences of the Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone.214 Additionally, domestic subject-matter jurisdiction has
played a very small role in the SCSL trials. 215 Alternatively, domestic crimes would be the
only offenses tried at the STL.216
No court decision has directly addressed the question of whether a UN created tribunal
that prosecutes crimes which are not universally recognized as being international falls under
the ICJ Arrest Warrant case definition of “certain international criminal courts” that have the
power to eliminate claims of immunity.217 In the Arrest Warrant Case the ICJ limited the
removal of immunity to stricto senso crimes to international tribunals, and explicitly stated that
William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 513, 518
(2008) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44]
212

213

Id.
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Id.
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216
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William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 516 (2008)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44 ]
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the exception to immunity does not exist in customary international law for national courts. 218
Individuals seeking immunity protections before the STL may argue that the STL is a domestic
court unrightfully granted additionally powers by the UN. Additionally, that defining a
tribunal as international that only has domestic subject matter jurisdiction impedes on the
sovereign rights of nations, and the Arrest Warrant court’s apprehension to expand the
definition of what constitutes an “international court” is reflected in its statement that it “too
new to admit of any definite answer” on what exactly what constitutes an “international
court”.219
The court in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor supported this stance when the SCSL relied on
customary international law and upheld immunities in national courts even when the crimes
were those typically tried in international courts.220 However, Judge Christine van den
Wyngaert’s dissent in the Arrest Warrant case supports the concept of allowing tribunals that
are characteristically hybrid, like the STL, to exercise universal jurisdiction and eliminate state
official immunities if doing so ensures “the whole recent movement in modern international
criminal law towards recognition of the principle of individual accountability for international

218

Mark A. Summers, Immunity, or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State
Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States that are Not Parties to
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 463, 488
(2006).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 45 ]
William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 518 (2008)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44]
219

220

Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, A.
Ch., 31 at ¶50 (May 2004) (the court tried war crimes or crimes against humanity) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab ]
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crimes” is not ignored. 221 This is especially important for the STL where most of the accused
will be current high-ranking state officials and will be afforded complete immunity if it is
determined the tribunal is inherently domestic and not “international”.222
f)

Conclusion

Defining the STL as an international tribunal will trigger a vital exception to eliminating
state official immunity claim. If the STL is determined to be a domestic rather than an
international court, claims for immunity from Syrian high-ranking state officials will be
recognized even if the crime of terrorism is categorized as a stricto senso crime. If the STL is
considered an international and not a domestic court, it will be provided universal jurisdiction,
and the ability to enforce “criminal or civil sanctions for violations of international law.” 223
This was exemplified in the Special Court for Sierra Leone where it was determined that because
the court was international in nature it was able to prosecute Charles Taylor a foreign head of
state.224
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Mark A. Summers, Immunity, or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State
Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States that are Not Parties to
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 463, 486
(2006).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 24 ]
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William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International
Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 Leiden Journal of
International Law 513, 517 (2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44 ]
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accompanying notebook II at Tab 24]
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The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has a parallel level of authority vested to it, and is
characteristically very similar to international hybrid tribunals; nonetheless, terrorism is not a
universally recognized “international” crime and has never been the sole subject matter
jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Individuals claiming immunity before the STL will
argue that this domestic subject matter jurisdiction eliminates the tribunals claim to being an
international court. It is likely that the method of creation through the Security Council coupled
with the support of the tribunal in Lebanon will factor highly into this determination and the
tribunal will be deemed international. If the STL cannot eliminate claims of high-ranking state
official immunity because they are considered an international court, the Office of the Prosecutor
may look to two other recognized exceptions to immunity.
2.

Waiver of Immunity by Government through a Treaty

The second possible exemption to high-ranking state official immunity claims is
government waiver through a treaty. The government of a high-ranking official holds the rights
to the individual’s immunity and therefore may waive it through a treaty.225 The jurisdiction for
treaty based crimes is limited to the provisions of the treaty and does not provide complete
universal jurisdiction and waiver for all crimes committed outside the prohibitions of the
treaty.226 Additionally, it will only be applicable if both states are members to the treaty.227 If
there exists a treaty that both Syria and Lebanon have ratified and that addresses attacks similar
225

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2140 (1999)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 37 ]
226

Yitha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law, Ashgate Publishing Company
Burlington, VT (2004). )[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 33 ]
227

Id.
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to what occurred in the Hariri bombing, then the state whose official is being tried will have
waived the officials’ immunity, and will be required to either prosecute or extradite the
official.228
a)

The Pinochet Case waiver through the Torture Convention

An example of waiver of immunity by treaty occurred in the Pinochet case before the
United Kingdom House of Lords. In the Pinochet case, authorities issued an international arrest
warrant to apprehend the former head of state of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, for allegations of
torture during his time as Chile’s head of state. 229 United Kingdom (UK) officials arrested
Pinochet while he was visiting the UK and Spain then requested his extradition.230 The Law
Lords determined that customarily a former head of state such as Pinochet would be afforded
immunity for acts of torture, however the court did not grant him immunity because Chile had
ratified the Torture Convention of 1988 and consequently waived head of state immunity
protections for acts of torture.231
b)
Syrian Waiver of High-Ranking State Official Immunities
through the Ratification of the Convention Against Terrorist Bombings

228

Id.
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Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal
Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press New York, NY
(2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 28 ]
230

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2130 (1999).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 37 ]
231
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Similarly, it is possible that Syria’s ratification of several UN anti-terrorism treaties are
evidence of a waiver of high ranking state official immunities for terrorist attacks through a
treaty. In order to waive immunity through a treaty it must address the issue at hand, and all
involved parties in litigation must ratify the treaty.232 A treaty that both Syria and Lebanon
ratified is the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.233 This
convention requires that all parties to the treaty criminalize certain types of conduct, surrender
for prosecution, or extradite people apprehended in national boundaries that are suspected of the
described crimes, and assist in the investigation and trial of the crime.234 The attack the tribunal
is prosecuting falls under article 22 of the treaty that requires the attack occur with explosives,
happen in a public place, and cause death or bodily harm or massive economic loss.235

The

bombing of Hariri’s motorcade happened in the middle of a public road, and occurred with the

232

Id.
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International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 37 ILM 249
(1998).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7]
234

Samuel M. Witten, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: The International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 92 A.J.I.L. 774, 775 (1998).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 50 ]
235

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 37 ILM 249 Article
2(1)(1998) stating:
“Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person
unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or
other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility,
a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:
(a) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system,
where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic
loss.”)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 28 ]
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intention of causing bodily harm or injury.236 It also covers those accomplices and those
individuals who direct or organize terrorist bombing attacks.237 If the attack falls under the
subject matter this treaty was drafted to address, the language of the treaty must be evaluated to
determine if immunity was waived through the treaty.
Syria may claim that while they did ratify the treaty, nothing in the treaty specifically
addresses the waiver of immunity and that through signing the treaty they did not explicitly
waive immunity claims.238 However, the torture convention in the Pinochet case also did not
address immunity.239 While several of the Law Lords in Pinochet expressed that implicit
waivers of state official immunity are not preferential under international law, the court still held
that immunity was implicitly waived through the ratification of the treaty.240 The Law Lords
who used the torture convention for justification of waiving Pinchot’s immunity focused on the
purpose of the convention more than its language.241 The purpose of the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings is to reinforce the ability of the

Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1061 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/melia_bouhabib/1.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 38 ]
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Samuel M. Witten, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: The International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 92 A.J.I.L. 774, 776 (1998).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 50 ]
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international community to explore, bring to court, and extradite individuals directly responsible
for, conspirators and those who direct or contribute to any of the offenses defined in the
Treaty.242

This purpose is apparent throughout the different articles of the convention. It also

reaffirms the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism that states,
“The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their unequivocal
condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and
unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize
the friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and
security of States”243
It is arguable that through ratification of this treaty Syria has agreed to remove
immunities for whomever” is responsible for the Hariri terrorist bombing, in order for the
internationally community to fully condemn the act of terrorism. However, Syria may claim that
the ratification of these treaties provides it the power to try the accused in their own court
systems, eliminates the need for an international tribunal, and affords it the ability to enforce
head of state immunity. Article 8(1) of the treaty states,
“The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in cases to
which article 6 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged without exception
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory to submit the case. . . to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with
the laws of that State.”244
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Samuel M. Witten, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: The International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 92 A.J.I.L. 774, 776 (1998).[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 50 ]
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International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, G.A. Res. 164, U.N.
GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1998), entered into force May 23,
2001. [reproduced in accompanying notebook I at tab 7 ]
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This portion of the convention allows Syria the opportunity to not extradite their officials
as long as they are tried before the Syrian Courts as any other individual who has committed
crimes similar in nature would be tried.245 It is arguable that any kind of prosecution of a highranking state official in Syrian courts would be for show, and that it is unlikely the same
standards of impartialness would apply if the same individual was tried at the STL.
Additionally, the Office of the Prosecutor could argue that past trials of high-ranking state
officials in the nations own domestic courts often provided inadequate results. An example
occurred in Germany after World War II when the Allied Associated Powers granted Germany
the power to try Germans who were suspected of violating the laws and customs of war in their
own domestic courts. The Reichsgericht only prosecuted twelve of the forty-five German
military officers the Allied Associated Powers submitted, convicted six of the twelve prosecuted
and gave the six light sentences.
While implicit waiver of state official immunity through the ratification of the Terrorist
Bombing Convention mirrors the decision of the Pinochet case, unlike the Torture Convention
the issue of trying individuals responsible for the attacks is explicitly addressed. Therefore it is
likely that Syria will still be afforded the opportunity to first try their officials in their own local
courts, and the treaty will not prohibit claims of Syrian state official immunity.
c)
Waiver through Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations
Charter

245

Samuel M. Witten, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: The International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 92 A.J.I.L. 774, 779 (1998)(stating that the prosecution of
the individual must occur "without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory" ).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 50 ]
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The Office of the Prosecutor may argue that even if Syria is afforded the right to try its
own officials under the Terrorist Bombing Convention they must still comply with the requests
of the STL because Articles 25 and 103 of the UN mandate their compliance with Security
Council requests. Article 25 of the UN Charter States, “The Members of the United Nations
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.” 246 The STL was enacted under the Security Councils Chapter VII powers, and
arguably, all member states of the UN should comply with its requests. The Syrian government
will contest that this multilateral treaty allowing them to try their own high-ranking state officials
for acts of terrorism takes precedence over the requests of the Security Council. However,
Article 103 of the UN Charter states, “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” This same
argument was used in the Lockerbie bombing case before the ICJ. In the Lockerbie case, a Pan
Am flight from Frankfurt to New York via London exploded over Scotland and killed all 259
individuals on the flight.247 Libya was charged with the attack and, the United Kingdom and the
United States requested that Libya surrender their suspects for trial either in Scotland or in the
United States.248 The Security Council consequently adopted three resolutions (731, 748 and

246

Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V art. 25, Chapter VII, Chapter XVI art.103, available
at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter.shtml. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at 11].
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Abdul Ghafur Hamid and Khin Maung Sein, A Legal implication of the Lockerbie Case: Can
the Internatonal Court of Justice Judicially Review Security Council Decisions?, available at
http://staff.iiu.edu.my/ghafur/Published%20Articles/A%20Legal%20Implication%20of%20Lock
erbie%20case.pdf [reproduced in accompanying notebook at 60]
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883, two of which imposed sanctions) urging Libya "to provide a full and effective response" to
the requests of the United Kingdom and the United States "so as to contribute to the elimination
of international terrorism.”249 The US and UK brought a case to the ICJ requesting extradition of
Libyan nationals, and Lydian officials claimed that under the Montréal Convention they were
afforded the right to choose between extradition and prosecution in a Libyan court.250 The court
held that Libya was required under Article 25 to comply with the Security Council Resolution
748, and that Article 103 of the charter took precedence over the Montreal Convention
provisions.251
This reasoning requires Syrian officials to comply with the tribunal under Security
Council Resolution 1757, however as previously addressed in this memorandum, the Security
Council’s enforcement powers for the STL are different the enforcement powers for other ad hoc
tribunals created under its Chapter VII powers.252 The waiver by treaty under the Lockerbie
holding will be a strong argument for the Office of the Prosecutor for removing high ranking
official immunities.

3. Waiver by Consent of Government through other means either Explicitly or
Implicitly.
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Immunity is a privilege that belongs to the state and not the state official, and with this
power, a state can bestow or retract immunity.253 This is the third possible exception to current
and former high-ranking state official immunity, and is waiver by the government to which the
individual oversees either implicitly or explicitly.254 Additionally, diplomatic immunity “may be
waived by the sending state,” as, described in the Vienna Convention either expressly or
implicitly and the waiver for diplomatic immunity in this section of the memorandum is
analogous to high-ranking state official immunity.255
High-ranking state officials may be tried before the STL if their government waives the
official’s immunity. An example of explicit waiver occurred in the United States Federal Court
of Appeals Case In re Grand Jury Proceedings Doe #700 (In re Doe).256 In In re Doe, Ferdinand
Marco’s the President of the Philippines was accused along with his wife Imelda of embezzling
money from the Philippine government.257 Ferdinand left office, fled to the United States, and
claimed immunity from prosecution. The Philippine government issued a diplomatic note
expressly waving any immunity afforded to the two individuals. The court held that Ferdinand
253

The Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227 at Art. 32. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at Tab 4]
254

The Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227 at Art. 32. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at Tab 4 ]
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accompanying notebook I at Tab 4]
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In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1987). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook 20]
257

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1987). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook 20]
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the Marcos could be served process because the Philippine government expressly waived their
head of state immunity protections.258 The court based its decision on the Vienna Convention’s
afforded privileges of immunity waiver for diplomats, and explained that the same rationale
should be applied to high-ranking officials. Specifically that because of comity and respect of
sovereignty of nations who hold the power of immunities, the countries wishes for waiver must
be upheld.

259

Considering that Syria and Lebanon have a very bad political history, it is highly unlikely
that Syria will explicitly waive the immunities afforded to its high-ranking officials. Currently,
no diplomatic note or express waiver of immunity exists for the, and as previously mentioned
Syria has stated that any Syrian officials accused of the Hariri assassination will be tried in the
Syrian courts.260
D.
Additional Exceptions to immunities for Former High-ranking State Officials
for acts Committed Prior to and After the Individuals time in office, and for Acts
Outside of the Individuals “Official Capacity”
In addition to the three above analyzed exceptions to immunity (an individual being tried
before an international court, immunity waiver by treaty, and implied or explicit waiver by home
government), former high-ranking state official’s claims to immunity are susceptible to two
further exceptions to their immunity. Once out of office former high-ranking state officials may
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In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1987). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook 20]
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In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1987). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook 1 tab 20].
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Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L
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be tried for acts committed outside the scope of their position while in office.261 Additionally,
they will not be afforded immunity for acts committed before or after their term in office.
a)
Former High Ranking State Officials are Not Afforded
Functional Immunities for Acts committed Before or After Time in
Office.
After a high-ranking official leaves office, they are only entitled to immunity for “official
acts” completed while they were in office, their immunity protections do not reach to acts before
they took office or after they leave.262 In the U.S. court case In re Doe, the Marcoes, former
heads of states in the Philippines tried to argue that; “Head of State Immunity […] insulate[s]
foreign leaders from the chilling effect of being subjected to the jurisdiction of foreign courts at
some future date.”263 The court rejected this argument and stated;
“Since the purpose of Head of State Immunity is to avoid the disruption of foreign
relations, the original reason for immunizing the Marcoses - - protecting the relations
between the United States and the Marcos’ regime - - is no longer present. Head of State
Immunity serves to safeguard the relationship among foreign governments and their
leaders, not as the Marcoses assert, to protect former Heads of State regardless of their
lack of official status.”264
International tribunals follow in this line of thought, and if a Syrian official who is no
longer in office took part in the Hariri bombing either before or after they were in office they will
261
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not be afforded immunities before the STL. However, the protections afforded to former heads
of states in international tribunals is often broader and applies to official acts committed while
the individual was in office, if a former state official can prove the Hariri bombing was an
“official act” of his position, he will be afforded immunity.
b)
Former High Ranking State Officials are Not Afforded Personal
Immunities
The second exception to former high-ranking state official immunity is that unlike current
high-ranking state officials, former officials do not receive personal immunities for acts
committed outside of the scope of the “official capacity” of their position.265 “Official capacity”
is often determined on a very fact specific basis, and can be contrasted to personal immunity
protections for acts that an official commits purely in a private capacity.266 If an individual acts
in the framework of exercising state authority under international law, the actions are
accordingly completed on behalf of the state and afforded functional immunity protections.267
In the Arrest Warrant case the ICJ dictated that while a sitting High-ranking State official
may have Jurisdictional immunity for certain offenses in a certain time period (while they are in
office), they do not receive complete impunity from prosecution.268
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United Kingdom House of Lords Pinochet case addressed the scope of former high-ranking state
official immunity.269 Pinchot’s case became the first instance where an English court removed
state official immunity from former head of state.270 The House of Lords held that a former
Head of State is afforded immunity protections for acts he performed in his official capacity as a
Head of State.271

The court also established that acts “condemned as criminal by international

law” do not “amount to acts performed in the exercise of the [official] function of a Head of
State.”272 Pinochet was initially denied his claim for immunity for acts of torture and hostage
taking because; the court held that acts of such an atrocious nature are not official functions of a
high-ranking official.273 In the opinion, the court stated that not holding these officials
accountable would make a travesty of international law.274 This ruling may have set strong
precedent for categorizing the acts of terrorism being tried before the STL as outside of the scope
of any high ranking state official duties. However, the first Pinochet opinion was vacated due to
269
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an undisclosed conflict of interest of one of the Law Lords in the case who failed to recues
himself.275 In a second full bench trial the court dropped the charges of hostage taking on the
merits, and was left to decide the charges of torture, a topic that was previously discussed in this
memorandum.276 The crimes of terrorism being tried before the STL will need to be extremely
egregious to fall outside of the scope of official duties if hostage taking could be considered
protected under functional immunities. However, it could be argued that while the court
dismissed the hostage taking charges on the merits, it did not explicitly identify what level of
atrocious acts are in or outside of the scope official duties. This case established the lack of
functional immunity for state officials; personal immunity was not contested and a definition of
what acts qualify as part of an officials “positional duties,” it is necessary to look further into
case law to define each category.277
In the United States case, U.S. v. Noriega former General Manuel Noriega of Panama
was charged for covering up and aiding a significant narcotics trade, Noriega attempted to
claim head of state immunity and the U.S.’s lack of jurisdiction to eliminate his possible
prosecution. The court held that Noriega would not be afforded his claims of immunity on the
grounds that he was not recognized as a head of state as he was discharged from his position
when his court case began, however they also pointed to the non-official character of the
275
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crimes that were committed.278 The court through this decision expressed that trading in
narcotics will not be considered an activity commenced under the official capacity of a highranking official.279
Another case that addressed the scope what acts are not protected under the “official
capacity” exception for former high ranking state official claims is the case of Rainbow
Warrior. In Rainbow Warrior the crimes committed by secret service officials in the territory
of a foreign state was addressed.280 A Dutch photographer was killed when two violent
explosions took place on board a Greenpeace ship name the Rainbow Warrior while it was in
the port of Auckland, New Zealand.281 New Zealand arrested and convicted two French secret
service officials for complicity in manslaughter and willful damage to a ship, however France
claimed that they had instructed the agents to sink the ship and that the attack occurred inside
their functional immunity protections.282 The case was eventually brought before UN
arbitration, and while the Secretary General did not discuss the issue of personal responsibility,
he did hold that the individuals responsible were to be put in solitary confinement in a French

278

United States v. Noriega 746 F Supp 1506 (US, DC for the Southern District of Florida, 1990)
1519; United States v. Noriega 117 F 3d 1206 (US, Ct. of Apps. (11th Cir., 1997).[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 27 ]
279

Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal
Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, NY 115
(2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 28 ]
280

Id.

281

Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal
Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, NY 126
(2008).[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 28]
282

Id.

86

Heather Ludwig
War Crimes Lab Fall 2009
Office of the Prosecutor Special Tribunal for Lebanon
military facility for at least three years. 283 This holding implicitly supports the idea that
causing death by intentional bombing is not considered in the “official scope” of a state
officials position, and therefore not afforded functional immunity protections.284
Syrian government officials may argue that because of the nature of the tumultuous
relationship between Lebanon and Syria that the bombing was a political attack furthering an
external conflict, and was not personal in nature, therefore both former and current highranking Syrian officials should be afforded immunity protections. In the U.S. case Doe v.
Karadzic the court stated, “we doubt that the acts of even a state official, taken in violation a
nation’s fundamental law and wholly ungratified by that nation’s government could properly
characterized as an act of state.”285 As previously discussed in this memo, Syria ratified the
Convention against Terrorist Bombings and consequently accepted this treaty into their
domestic law.286 Accepting the reasoning used by the court in the U.S. Karadzic case the
facilitation of the Hariri car bombing by Syrian Officials is in violation of a treaty both Syria
and Lebanon are signors to. The Ratification of the Treaty is a reflection of their domestic
laws, and invalidates claim from officials that the attack occurring in an “official capacity.” It
is unlikely that former high-ranking state officials will be able to claim the Hariri assassination

283

Id.

284

Id.

285

Diego A. Archer, MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR -ISSUE 5: HEAD OF
STATE DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law War Crimes Research Project 35 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
52]
286

Supra Memorandum Section titled, Syrian Waiver of High-Ranking State Official Immunities
through the Ratification of the Convention Against Terrorist Bombings.

87

Heather Ludwig
War Crimes Lab Fall 2009
Office of the Prosecutor Special Tribunal for Lebanon
was part of an “official” act required by their position, accordingly claims by former highranking state officials will not stand before the STL.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Individuals bringing claims before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will be afforded

their claimed immunities unless the tribunal is, 1) considered an “international” tribunal, 2) the
government has waived their immunities through a treaty, or 3) the government has waived their
immunities either implicitly or explicitly. The subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal will be
the biggest impediment for it being considered an “international” tribunal, however it is likely
that because the Security Council created the STL the definition of “international” will be
afforded to it. If the tribunal is not considered international, immunity claims may be eliminated
because Syria has ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing. This is the strongest exception to immunity claims, however the STL will face
problems with obtaining accused individuals even with Security Council backing. It is unlikely
that Syria will relinquish the immunity protections of high-ranking officials either implicitly or
explicitly to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon because of the violent past the two countries share.
The STL will not encounter difficulties trouncing claims from former high ranking state officials
because it is unlikely that a terrorist bombing act that took the lives of not only Mr. Hariri but
also 22 other individuals will be considered an “official act”. Overall, the tribunal will be able to
overcome all claims of immunity from all lower ranking state officials, and likely all former
high-ranking state officials. Claims of immunity from current high ranking state officials will be
the strongest, and defeating those claims will be completely dependent on one of the
aforementioned exceptions for the STL.
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